

- Sally 1) positive—negative二
 Hannah 2) positive二negative三
 Ariel 3) positive三negative一四

周二 29号 body全部写完, suggestion一起讨论写
 1号 intro&conclusion写完

introduction	
positive: PRP 是好的	
<p>理由一 :</p> <p>给老师 incentives, (尤其在私立学校更明显)</p> <p>GGK和FT模型和数据论证这一点</p>	<p>印度 :</p> <p>p474</p> <p>In this study we do find a positive relationship between teacher’s pay and student achievement. Clearly causation may go both ways, teachers are rewarded as their students perform better and such pay in turn elicits better student outcomes. To our knowledge, few have addressed the issue of endogeneity in assessing the relationship between pay and achievement, and none appear to have the data that enables a direct comparison of the effect, for similarly aged children, across the private and government sectors.</p> <p>Even if causality is established as running from higher wage to improved student achievement, the relationship is open to alternative interpretations. One is that a positive impact from wages onto achievement reflects the fact that higher wages likely attract better quality people into the pool of applicants for teaching jobs. A second interpretation is that higher pay raises achievement by raising the effort of existing teachers. In terms of the efficiency wage theory, better paid teachers are likely to work harder in order to increase the chances of retaining their more valuable jobs. The paper will test these alternative explanations of the wage effect on student achievement.</p> <p><u>the model and data</u></p> <p>Our model consists of two equations: an earnings function for teacher pay and a production function for student achievement.</p> <p>p480</p> <p>Permanence of job contract is not rewarded in the government sector but is in the private sector. It is likely that in the public sector permanency of contract is mandated for every teacher but that the private sector offers permanency to attract or retain good teachers.</p>

	<p>p483 Interpreting the results for achievement We have argued that for private schools there is evidence for causation running from teacher's pay to achievement. We consider two potential interpretations of this result. The most popular explanation is that salaries proxy for teacher quality: raising wages encourages better quality candidates to apply for teaching positions, thereby raising the average quality of teachers. A second interpretation comes from efficiency wage theory. Under this, higher wages improve student achievement by increasing teacher effort at any given level of teacher quality.</p> <p>p484 Under the efficiency wage hypothesis, there must be fear of losing a well-paid job in order for higher wages to elicit higher effort. In private schools, the flexibility of managers to set wages and dismiss lax teachers means that efficiency wages are an incentive lever that managers can use to enhance teacher incentives. Since government funded teaching jobs in India are mostly permanent contracts with little chance of dismissal, efficiency wages are not available as an effort-motivating device in the public school sector.</p>
<p>理由二： 促进学生成绩，摆两个数据</p>	<p>英国 p259 We find that the scheme did improve test score gains, on average by about 40% of a grade per pupil.</p> <p>Cross-country evidence p410 The basic result suggests that student achievement is significantly higher in countries that make use of teacher performance pay than in countries that do not use it, after extensively controlling for student, school, and country background measures. On average, students in countries with performance-related pay score 24.8% of a standard deviation higher on the PISA math test.</p> <p>-----> 正向循环： 印度p484 We have found that private schools relate pay to teacher's performance as measured by student achievement and that achievement is improved by increasing teacher's pay.</p>

	<p>Cross-country evidence p409 countries that adopt performance-related pay may be more likely to have more flexible salary schedules also in other dimensions, which may in turn be related to student outcomes</p>
<p>理由三 教师提供更好教育，整体提升教育质量</p>	<p>英国 p259 But our results suggest that teacher-based performance pay is a policy tool that education authorities should consider as part of their drive to raise educational performance.</p> <p><i>Teacher behavior under performance pay incentives</i> p159 <i>Some policy makers have advocated that performance pay can act as a retention device to keep quality teachers from leaving the profession.</i></p>
<p>过渡： 局限：论据小范围，模型理想化</p>	
<p>negative</p>	
<p>理由一： 难衡量，怎么决定，决定者（评估者）有谁决定</p>	<p>Rewarding better teacher p67 With respect to the former, two modes of pay determination are common: either the decision is made by the board but with the particular corporate executive not present when his or her individual package is being discussed; or the decision is made by a Remuneration Committee composed of non-executive directors (Parkinson, 1993). Both methods have come under attack on grounds of conflicts of interest. In the former case, it has been argued that other corporate executives have little incentive to drive down the remuneration of their colleague since this would impact on their own pay settlement. Similarly, non-executive directors are both usually appointed by the board and are themselves executive directors of other companies. Again there is an argument that they have an interest in not cutting executive remuneration (Parkinson, 1993: 218).secondary citation</p> <p><i>teacher behavior under performance pay incentives</i> p153</p>

	<p><i>In addition to expenditures and graduation rates playing an important role in the decision to implement performance pay, the interaction of the two variables may also drive that decision. E.g. political and parental pressure could be stronger on district officials where expenditures are high and graduation rates are low.</i></p> <p>p160</p> <p><i>In addition, districts in urban areas are closer to universities and may be influenced as to whether or not performance pay is implemented</i></p>
<p>理由二：</p> <p>老师方面：负面情绪：比较、尴尬、功利、厌倦----->恶性竞争，评估多元</p>	<p>Teachers' perceptions p389 比较, 尴尬</p> <p>The teachers perceive the PRP system as arbitrary, unfair, unclear and feel that it fosters an awkward working environment. In summary, the findings indicate that the pay scheme does not contribute to the improvement of results by constructing clear connections between salary, motivation and results.</p> <p>p387 不信任感 trust</p> <p>my conclusion is that most of the teachers do not trust the way the pay-setting scheme is operated. This is apparent from their lack of approval and understanding of the criteria and how they are used to measure performance, as well as the distrust of the school-leaders' competence, knowledge or judgement regarding salary-setting.</p> <p>p386 缺乏交流 take for granted</p> <p>Most teachers do not understand how the criteria are used to measure their performance, and several teachers find the salary-setting dialogues with their line manager of little or no value, or have not taken part in such dialogues.</p> <p>The emotional impact p451</p> <p>The majority of teachers, however, felt that they deserved a pay rise, not a rise in pay dependent on performance. Many agreed with the idea of there being 'something to aspire to for a classroom teacher' but resented having to 'prove themselves' via a set of procedures that they regarded as adding to the bureaucratic burdens already upon them.</p>
<p>理由三：</p> <p>学生方面：沦为功利性工具，家长选择更好的教师---好学校选择更好</p>	<p>the emotional impact p453 学生被看做是工具</p> <p>Alternatively, it is possible that the new policies will bring about a culture shift in teaching. Rather than relationships with students forming the basis for teaching and learning, students could become further reduced to the means through which teachers meet their targets (or not). Staff frustration with children perceived as impeding teachers' progress against targets is likely to find its counterpart in pupil resistance to being</p>

<p>的学生---> 产 生竞争---> 学 生不公平</p>	<p>viewed instrumentally. p453为了迎合指标忘记本质工作 There is a real danger too that the heightened concern with creating and collecting evidence is diverting teachers' attention away from teaching.</p> <p>micro neoliberalism in China p70 shadow education教育不公平 To sum up, as a result of government efforts to equalize the mainstream system, a new hierarchy emerged under the neoliberal forces. At the top are key private and public schools, next are schools related to these institutions, then come ordinary schools in developed districts, and finally come ordinary schools in less developed districts. Equalization policies have strengthened some of the weak schools and increased the number of schools in the second-top layer. However, the new stratification drives families with expectations and sufficient resources to find ways to access the desirable schools; and similarly, it drives the schools to compete for high-performing students. Shadow education has assisted both the consumers and the providers in the process.</p>
<p>理由四： 没有工资系统 motivation+ fair 矛盾</p>	<p>teachers' perceptions p389 Furthermore, there does not seem to be any wide-spread knowledge about a pay system which both spurs motivation and is regarded as fair.</p> <p><i>teacher behavior under performance pay incentives</i> p160-161 <i>If districts are using performance pay incentives simply to make their teacher salaries equivalent with those in other districts, then we would not expect performance pay to influence teacher behavior.</i></p>
<p>suggestion of improvements rethinking</p>	
<p>1) 针对 negative第二 点缺乏交流</p>	<p>teachers' perceptions p389增加理解, 教育讲座 However, I suggest that the study contributes to a deeper understanding of how a PRP system may work in practice, which could be useful in similar contexts and prove to be valuable for those involved in such pay-setting systems.</p>
<p>2) performance</p>	<p>the emotional impact p453 Finally, there was considerable evidence that, managed well and leaving</p>

related opportunity 教师发展 career development	pay aside, a <u>developmentally oriented system</u> of performance management linked with opportunities for further professional learning was welcomed by teachers and managers alike.
conclusion	